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I. INTRODUCTION
Ironically, piracy needs no introduction. Piratical episodes have
burdened maritime fleets throughout the world since the reign of the
seventeenth-century Vikings.' Beginning in the late-eighteenth-cen-
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tury, Congress enacted a series of laws that created criminal remedies
against general piracy as defined by the law of nations.2 One of the
first Supreme Court decisions to interpret American piracy laws was
the 1820 case of United States. v. Smith, in which the Court held that
robbery at sea constituted piracy.3 Nearly 200 years have passed since
the United States courts made a thorough reexamination of our laws
that govern the prosecution of maritime crimes, 4 and that is where the
issue at hand lies. This note demonstrates that the crime of general
piracy implicates an expansive body of rules. The law of nations has
naturally broadened in scope regarding the current definition of piracy.
Throughout the duration of this note, it is important to bear in mind
that United States Code on general piracy is inseparable from the law
of nations at all points in time.5
Recent events are forcing federal district court judges to deter-
mine how to properly adjudicate the uproar of modern-day piracy.6
Within the past twenty years, piratical encounters, specifically those
spawning around the Horn of Africa, have caught global attention.7
After the fall of the Somali government in 1991, seagoing vessels sail-
ing near the Gulf of Aden found themselves at the mercy of sea
plunderers." By early 2011, the Obama Administration authorized de-
fense tactics to fend off perpetrators against American vessels, and in
2006, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to criminalize pirates as de-
fined under the law of nations.9
Recent cases from the Eastern District of Virginia, in attempt-
ing to interpret the scope and extent of section 1651 pursuant to the
law of nations, created a conundrum upon which the overarching issue
of this note is based. In United States v. Said, Judge Jackson main-
2. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612-14 (E.D. Va. 2010) (outlining the
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 and Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510).
3. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 (1820).
4. See id.; see also Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2011) (explaining the "crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations").
6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that courts must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations of the world today).
7. Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2011, www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-11813168 [hereinafter Q&A].
8. Id.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); Peter Grier, Somali pirates: Do Shootings of Four
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tained the "robbery at sea" requirement articulated in Smith'o - the
court found that section 1651 was inapplicable where defendants as-
saulted a United States vessel without physically taking property from
the ship." In contrast, merely two months later, the same court in
United States v. Hasan, under a different bench, recognized that the
offense of general piracy connotes a non-comprehensive scope of acts.12
In the presiding Judge Davis's opinion - with respect to the recent
threats against American vessels off the Horn of Africa13 - federal
courts must review piracy cases with broad deference to the wide-
spread nature of contemporary piracy.14
This note explores the latter reasoning to demonstrate why the
Said decision, which was based upon Smith's obsolete guidance, fails to
advance an accurate definition of general piracy. Section II traces the
origin of United States authority to define and punish piracy and illus-
trates the reach of that authority vis-A-vis international customary
law. The third section outlines the evolution of the Supreme Court's
precedent regarding the definition of piracy and analysis of the law of
nations. This timeline includes legislative enactments, Supreme Court
case law, and persuasive foreign authority and literature that further
support the movement towards broadening the construction of contem-
porary piracy laws. Finally, section IV reviews the Said court's
decision, in light of the most-current law of nations on general piracy,
to highlight the errors in the court's reasoning.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of Piracy
For centuries, the international community has perceived pi-
rates as hostis humani generis: enemies of all mankind.15 Historically,
pirates are considered robbers at sea.' 6 They attack seagoing vessels
10. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30.
13. At Sea, supra note 1.
14. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (noting courts recognize the "modern international
consensus definition of general piracy" which an overwhelming majority of nations have
accepted).
15. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (citing Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 139 (2004) [hereinafter Implementing Sosa]).
16. Smith, 18 U.S. at 163.
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both within and beyond national boundaries, thus causing havoc to the
dismay of any seagoing vessel they encounter.17
The term "piracy" denotes a practice that has recently become
an epidemic that is far more convoluted than seventeenth-century Vik-
ings and fairytale buccaneers preying on rum ships.18 Particularly,
Somali piracy caught the attention of mainstream media over the past
few years, though it erupted in the turn of the twentieth century.
These hijackers emerged in response to a surge of illegal fishing raids
that occurred soon after the Somali government collapsed in 1991.19
Somalia nationals began acting as vigilantes and raided the Somali
waters to ransack commercial fishing fleets of their taxes.20 In fact,
fishing activities have been the historical nexus to piracy throughout
the world.21
Today, however, Somali pirates continue to terrorize the east-
ern region of international waters but with a slightly different modus
operandi.22 Somalis generally raid seagoing cargo ships between India
and Africa, holding the vessels as well as the crew members as hos-
tages for months until the demanded ransoms are settled. 23 However,
the pirates have typically been reluctant to harm any captives due to
their desire to obtain the ransom payment.24 One of the first seizures
to capture global media attention occurred in 2008 when Somalis com-
mandeered a Ukrainian weapon freighter and ransomed it for $3.2
million.25 Empirical data indicates that through at least 120 attacks in
the Gulf of Aden, pirates netted in excess of $100 million that year.26
While the first documented capture of American citizens was
reported in early 2009, the beginning of 2011 marked the first Ameri-
can fatality occurring in the line of piracy.27 This murder arose in
response to a 34-year federal prison sentence against a Somali pirate.28
17. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
18. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARv. L. REv. 334,
334-35 (1925) [hereinafter Obsolete].
19. At Sea, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1900) (blockade squadron
seized and auctioned Cuban fishing vessels), and Davison v. Seal-skins, 7 F. Cas. 192
(C.C.D. Conn. 1835) (regarding sealskins stolen from claimants boat).
22. At Sea, supra note 1.
23. Id.
24. Grier, supra note 9.
25. At Sea, supra note 1.
26. Id.
27. Id. (In April of 2009, Somali pirates captured six ships, including the Maersk
Alabama, an American vessel.).
28. Grier, supra note 9.
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Thereafter, President Obama authorized the use of deadly force
against pirates whenever American citizens or vessels were deemed to
be in imminent danger.29 The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea ("UNCLOS") also granted nations at large the authority to
seize and prosecute suspected pirates, insofar as individual municipal
laws permit such.30 In light of the foregoing events, however, foreign
nations have been hesitant to actively pursue and prosecute persons
identified as pirates.31 Furthermore, factors, such as the lengthy time
it takes to prosecute such persons, and the lack of resources necessary
to execute their prosecutions, have discouraged various nations from
exercising their adjudicative authority. 32 Yet, the United States has
charged itself to vindicate the law of nations to battle global piracy.33
B. Constitutional Authority to "Define and Punish" Piracy
In the eighteenth century, the Articles of Confederation were
drafted to afford Congress the power to appoint courts for the adjudica-
tion of "Piracies and Felonies committed upon the seas."34 During the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, the drafters expounded upon the
"Piracies and Felonies" phrase.35 What became known as the Define
and Punish Clause provided in pertinent part that "Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."36 The Of-
fense Clause, particularly, authorized Congress to apply federal
legislation outside the confines of United States borders, given that
"high seas" by definition means territory beyond national boundaries. 37
Today the Define and Punish Clause continues to afford Congress the
29. Id.
30. Q&A, supra note 7.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715-16 (2004).
34. Eugene Kontorovich, The "Define and Punish" Clause and the Limits of Universal
Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 149, 150, 161 (2009) [hereinafter Define and Punish].
35. Id. at 162.
36. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, CL. 10.
37. United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 720 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990)); Cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (To ensure that American laws will not unintentionally encroach into foreign
jurisdictions, federal courts cannot enforce municipal laws beyond the confines of U.S.
territory unless Congress expressly authorized such action.).
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power to criminalize piracy in a way that corresponds with the exercise
of universal jurisdiction.38
Many considerable concerns arose that shaped the framers' leg-
islative intent to afford Congress the "define and punish" power. First,
the framers aimed to establish a uniform standard of conduct that
would allow the national government to exercise jurisdiction over
crimes that could produce tension with foreign governments.39 Conse-
quently, it was argued that Congress should not have to transfer to the
states its plenary power over foreign relations.40 Framers also pre-
sumed that foreign governments should directly coordinate with the
federal government, not individual states, regarding piracy crimes that
involved American citizens or instrumentalities.41
On the contrary, the legislative history that drove the recon-
struction of the Define and Punish Clause indicated that framers on
the Articles of Confederation were apprehensive about negative ramifi-
cations of the clause. 42 One of the issues raised concerned whether the
language simply implicated legislative powers of preexisting crimes. 43
It was unclear as to whether the original language of the Define and
Punish Clause would tightly restrict Congress to those crimes, or gave
Congress the discretion to depart from the existing meanings of the
offenses. 44 Second, drafters suggested that the language also chal-
lenged the states' sovereign powers to define their own criminal laws.4 5
In other words, the clause transferred legislative authority from the
states to Congress to essentially create offense that already existed in
state law.4 6 Some debaters further highlighted perceivable implica-
tions of arrogance towards the law of nations, given that each country
played a role in its development. 47 Finally, the drafters of the Articles
noted particular redundancies between "Piracies" and "Felonies . . .
and Offenses."48 Despite this concern, scholars suggest that the fram-
ers carefully employed the word "piracies" to highlight substantive
38. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also
discussion infra Part I.C.ii (discussing universal jurisdiction).
39. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 169.
40. Id. at 170.
41. Id. at 171.






48. Id. at 163-65.
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differences from that of "Felonies" and "Offenses."49 Particularly, the
drafters parsed the term "Pirac[y]" to mean "a subspecies of felony"
that "necessarily occurs on high seas" and "against the law of
nations."5 0
At least some of those debates diffused as quickly as they arose.
For instance, the Continental Congress encouraged state legislatures
to enact criminal laws that afforded remedies already available at com-
mon law for violations against the law of nations.5 1 More recently,
federal courts have required claims to be based on the modern law [of
nations] and to fall within the purview of specific international
matters.52
Of the aforementioned discussions, the most compelling and rel-
evant debate to this note concerns the meanings of "define" and
"punish."5 3 Facially speaking, the original piracy legislation was "art-
lessly drafted."54 However, the context of "define" and "punish"
conspicuously required federal courts to reference the internationally
accepted definition of piracy, as per the law of nations.55 Ergo, the
Framers most likely intended federal courts to punish piratical acts as
other nations generally would.56 As today's scholars, lawyers, and
judges (should) comprehend, the Define and Punish Clause affords
Congress legislative authority to criminalize piracy committed on in-
ternational seas, that is, general piracy.57 But the federal courts must
coincide with the customary law of nations when exercising jurisdic-
tions over perpetrators of such offense.58
49. Id. at 164, 167.
50. Id. at 163.
51. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722 (2004).
52. Id. at 725.
53. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 162.
54. Dickinson, supra note 18, at 342-43.
55. Id.
56. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 168.
57. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 603-12 (explaining the guiding principles by which any
statute passed in accordance to the define and punish powers must be interpreted, as well
as examining Framers' understanding of piracy at time of nation's finding).
58. Id. at 609-10 ("Because of th[e] need for the United States law to reflect the
definition of general piracy agreed upon by the international community before universal
jurisdiction could attach . . ." and "for a crime to be cognizable in the federal courts of the
[states]," an act of Congress must have proscribed the offense through a "municipal law that
adequately embodied the international crime of piracy.).
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C. Piracy Under Customary Law
The term "piracy" denotes two distinct classes of offenses: mu-
nicipal and general piracy.59 Municipal piracy entails violations of a
nation's (or state's) municipal laws.60 On the other hand, piracy com-
mitted against the law of nations is general piracy.61 Here, the
majority of the following sections will focus on the latter category.
Prosecuting general piracy was the original purpose for creating
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.62 Federal courts have generally
accepted the premise that universal jurisdiction empowers any nation,
where an offender may be found, to prosecute acts of general piracy.63
To the same extent, customary international law permits a nation to
assert adjudicative authority over an individual engaged in acts of gen-
eral piratical magnitude. 64 This is true even where the offender's acts
occur in or against a foreign country,65 even if the perpetrator has no
connection with that country.66
The following expounds upon the customary international law
on general piracy and to whom jurisdiction over general piracy matters
is afforded.
1. International Customary Law and Law of Nations
The law of nations represents a paradigm of customary interna-
tional law.6 7 Out of a sense of legal obligation, the nations at large
bound themselves to this general body of rules.68 The law of nations
embodies a collection of national common laws that provides criminal
remedies for certain conduct occurring beyond domestic boundaries
and thus within the transnational realm.69 In that regard, no single
authoritative source epitomizes international customary law in its en-
59. Id. at 606.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Shi, 525 F.3d at 723; Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (stating international crime of
piracy was only universal jurisdiction crime by eighteenth century).
63. Id. (citing Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66
TEx. L. REV. 785, 803 (1988) [hereinafter Universal Jurisdiction]).
64. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiciton, 47 VA. J. INT'L L.
149, 157-62 (2006) [hereinafter Legal Limits].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
68. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1986)).
69. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
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tirety.70 To determine if a particular law, rule or practice coincides
with customary law, courts must first find such evidence in the cus-
toms and practices of civilized countries, particularly through formal
laws and judicial decisions.7 1 Courts further substantiate their find-
ings by examining and assessing corroborative secondary sources such
as scholarly articles.7 2
When the United States declared its independence from Great
Britain, it remained bound to the law of nations. 7 3 Commentators
have noted that the United States, in lieu of its declaration, remained
fixated to the international common law of certain crimes. 74 In 1781,
Congress charged states to enforce the law of nations against those ex-
pressed, customary offenses - one of which included general piracy.75
2. Universal Jurisdiction
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction generally provides that "a
state may define and prescribe punishment for any offense recognized
by the community of nations as having universal concern even where
there is no traditional basis for jurisdiction."76
As a universal crime, general piracy occurs beyond municipal
reach. It involves individuals acting without national authorization,
and disrupts international commerce and navigation.77 These charac-
teristics render general piracy jurisdictionally unique.7 8 As previously
mentioned, the crime falls within the purview of international custom-
ary law.79 Also, the offense often generates significant maritime
concerns.8 0 For these reasons, the phrase "general piracy" bears a
technical significance in international law.8 1
70. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (quoting Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D.
Cal. 1986).
71. Flores, 343 F.3d at 156.
72. Id.
73. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)).
74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
75. Id. at 715-16.
76. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (internal quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 611.
78. Id. at 605 (noting Framers of Constitution recognized piracy as a unique offense,
one that permitted nations to invoke universal jurisdiction and enable any country to
apprehend and prosecute pirates under their municipal jurisdiction, "irrespective of the
existence of a jurisdictional nexus"); Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 165.
79. Shi, 525 F.3d at 723.
80. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 166.
81. Id.
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Historically, the dichotomy of piracy in determining whether an
act constitutes an international crime or municipal crime has confused
states in regards to the circumstances in which something broader
than municipal jurisdiction may be exercised.8 2 Therefore, jurisdiction
as it pertains to international law necessarily falls within the scope of
international customary matters as well.8 3 Jurisdiction over a particu-
lar crime is based on collective state practices, 84 opiniojuris (opinion of
law),85 or a state's belief that it serves a legal purpose when it prose-
cutes that crime.86
Although customary law confers such discretionary authority
upon the sovereign states, it does so with a distinct restriction. A
state's adjudicative jurisdiction (power to subject an individual or
thing to its judicial process)87 depends upon its prescriptive jurisdic-
tion (power to apply its law to those objects).88 This means that a state
may subject an individual or thing to its judicial process only if it has
legislative power over the object.89
Traditionally speaking, a state may exercise its prescriptive ju-
risdiction over a foreigner's conduct that (1) happens within that
state's territory (subjective theory); (2) affects the state's territory (ob-
jective theory); (3) involves its national citizens (active or passive
theories); or (4) threatens national security (protective theory).90 Not-
withstanding a foreigner's harm against a nation's interest, a state
may not "unilaterally" enforce its municipal laws within the territory
of another state.91
However, universal jurisdiction may be invoked when the con-
duct in question constitutes a universal crime. 92 More specifically, a
state may assert criminal jurisdiction over an individual whose alleged
crimes were committed beyond the boundaries of the prosecuting state,
irrespective of nationality, country of residence or the like.9 3 For in-
stance, a flagged vessel - one that is registered to a particular nation -
is deemed an interest of its home nation's flag jurisdiction when the
82. Dickinson, supra note 18, at 336.
83. Colangelo, supra note 64, at 157.
84. Id. at 158.
85. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1125 (9th ed. 2009).
86. Colangelo, supra note 64, at 159.
87. Id. at 158.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 159.
91. Id. at 160.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 157-60
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vessel was attacked on common international waters. 94 Any victims on
board the vessel are also subject to the nation's passive jurisdiction be-
cause they are nationals of the state.95
In sum, a pirate acting against a foreign country subjects him-
self to universal prescriptive and consequently universal adjudicative
jurisdiction when he commits an offense against a vessel on high
seas.96 Any state that may encounter a pirate can claim criminal juris-
diction to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrator for his or her
alleged piratical acts.97
This notion of exercising universal jurisdiction over crimes like
general piracy is a unique concept in light of the doctrine's distinct
principles. First, the law of nations, by way of international customary
laws, directly dictates the substance of universal prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.98 Stated differently, the law of nations establishes the legislative
parameters within which the states, in exercising universal jurisdic-
tion, can adjudicate any subject matter in accordance with its
municipal laws.99 It therefore follows that universal prescriptive juris-
diction both defines the substance of universal crimes and authorizes
foreign tribunals to prosecute those crimes. 100
Viewed in its entirety, universal jurisdiction operates as a tool
by which the law of nations may engender jurisdiction throughout all
sovereign states as it relates to the prosecution of international crimes
such as general piracy.10 1
3. Expansive Recognition of Universal Jurisdiction
For decades, many nations perceived universal jurisdiction as
merely a theory, rather than a practice.102 A handful of governing bod-
ies from various nations considered the doctrine as controlling against
all universal crimes. Other states, including the United States, re-
fused to accept universal jurisdiction as a credible source of
authority. 03 In time, high-profiled events called for an expansion of
94. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 190 (2004) [hereinafter Piracy Analogy].
95. Id.
96. Colangelo, supra note 64, at 151.
97. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586, 589 (P.C.) (H.K).
98. Colangelo, supra note 64, at 161.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, supra note 97, at 589.
102. Kontorovich, supra note 94, at 192.
103. Id.
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universal jurisdiction. Commentators have noted three particular
events that influenced this movement: (1) post-World War II prosecu-
tions of German war criminals in Nuremberg;10 4 (2) the capture of
Adolf Eichmann and his prosecution for Nazi-affiliated massacres of
Jews (1961);1o5 and (3) Britain's detention of Augusto Pinochet for
crimes committed against Chileans (1988).106 Foreign tribunals have
become persuaded that the "harmful and murderous effects" of these
sorts of events, as well as piracy, have "shake[n] the international com-
munity to its very foundation," and the community recognizes the
legitimacy of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.107
III. CURRENT Pim4cy LAWS SINK JACKSON'S DECISION
A. U.S. Code on General Piracy
Title 18, Chapter 81 of the United States Code codifies a histori-
cal compilation of United States piracy laws in their evolved forms.108
Particularly, section 1651 embodies remnants of the framers' original
intent to empower Congress to define and punish piracy.109 Various
commentators have questioned the efficiency of section 1651 due to its
substantive implications and "obsolete" Supreme Court precedent re-
garding the prosecution of piratical acts.110 While Congress enacted
several piracy laws over the course of two centuries, American judicial
interpretation provided minimal guidance as to how courts should ap-
ply the current law to best reflect recent developments in maritime
crime."'
1. Act of 1790 and Palmer's Interpretation
Congress enacted the Act of April 30, 1790 ("Act of 1790") as the
initial, substantive law against maritime offenses.1 1 2 It states in perti-
nent part:
104. Randall, supra note 63, at 805-06.
105. Id. at 810-12
106. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 611.
107. Randall, supra note 63, at 812; Att'y Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 299
(Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962).
108. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'Yo Heave Ho!": Updating America's Piracy Laws, 21 CAL.
W. INr'L L.J. 151, 152 (1990) [hereinafter Updating].
109. Id. at 161.
110. See generally Dickinson, supra note 18.
111. Menefee, supra note 108, at 153.
112. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
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[t]hat if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or
in any river, haven, basin or bay, or of the jurisdiction of any partic-
ular state, murder or robbery . . . would by the laws of the United
States be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any
ship or other vessel, or any goods or feloniously run away with such
ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dol-
lars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if
any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby
to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods
committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every
such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate
and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death . . . .113
The plain language of the Act explicitly states that it applies to "any
person" and therefore suggests that the Act was likely drafted to pre-
scribe a general piracy law grounded in the universal jurisdiction
doctrine. 114 The Supreme Court, nonetheless, refused to advance such
an interpretation.11 5
The Court first interpreted the Act of 1790 in United States v.
Palmer16 where the Court was charged with determining the Act's ap-
plicability to foreign nationals.11 7 In Palmer, three foreign defendants
set sail from the United States, encountered and boarded a Spanish-
owned ship, assaulted the mariners, and plundered valuable merchan-
dise.118 Upon being captured and apprehended, the defendants were
indicted for piracy under the Act of 1790.119 The Supreme Court ruled
that the U.S. piracy law did not apply to a foreign national who com-
mitted robbery against a foreign vessel at sea.120
In analyzing the language of the Act, the Court looked past its
plain meaning and attempted to articulate reasons for narrowly con-
struing the scope of the Act. 121 Though it focused on the phrases "any
person or persons" and "any captain, or mariner of any ship or other
vessel," the Court refused to believe Congress intended to punish citi-
zens and foreigners.
113. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112.
114. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
115. See infra United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 613-17.
118. Id. at 611-12.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 633-34.
121. Id. at 623-33.
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2. Congress's Response: The Act of 1819
Following the Court's decision in Palmer, Congress enacted the
Act of 1819 to clarify its intention to prescribe piracy legislation capa-
ble of invoking universal jurisdiction over all piratical perpetrators. 1 2 2
The pertinent portion of the Act, Section 5, provides:
[tihat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and
such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or
found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall,
upon conviction thereof, before the circuit court of the United States
for the district into which he or they may be brought, or in which he
or they shall be found, be punished with death.123
Again, in 1820, the Supreme Court immediately found itself interpret-
ing section 5 of the Act in the seminal case of United States v. Smith.124
Smith exemplified a classic case of piracy, where the defendants com-
mandeered a seagoing vessel under foreign authority.125 Contra to
Palmer, the Court ventured further into its analysis to determine
what, as well as whom, the crime of piracy specifically entailed. 126
3. United States v. Smith
In Smith, prisoners that used violent resistance to overthrow a
private armed Spanish vessel near the port of Margaritta were in-
dicted in the United States for piracy.127 The Court held that, up to
the ruling of Smith, writers of common law, English civil law, and mar-
itime law had concurred that "robbery at sea" constituted piracy. 128
Although the Court may have intended for the substantive definition of
piracy, which required the robbery element, to be exhaustive, it seems
that such a definition was limited to Smith's facts. 129
Based on federal case law in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, the Smith decision was susceptible to criticism and consequent
modification.130 Also, within the language of the Act of 1819, Congress
122. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010).
123. Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510 (1819) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (2011)).
124. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
125. Id. at 154-55.
126. Id. at 161-62, 163, n.h.
127. Id. at 154-55.
128. Id. at 162.
129. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 621 (E.D. Va. 2010).
130. Id. at 622.
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deferred to the law of nations such that the definition of piracy would
continuously incorporate perpetual changes in the law, rather than
constantly revising it.131 Given the purported adaptive nature of the
substantive definition, the notion that the nineteenth and twentieth
century definition for piracy was exhaustive no longer seemed to pass
legislative muster. As previously noted, federal courts must, from time
to time, adopt the law of nations' most current definition. 132
4. Section 1651
Section 1651 in Title 18 of the United States Code, the modern-
day piracy statute, provides that "[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life."13 3 Although, the statute establishes a criminal remedy for piracy
"as defined by the law of nations," confusion remains amongst federal
courts of the same district in regards to the contemporary law of
nations. 134
B. Piracy and Its Effect on Modern U.S. Cases
In 2011, for the first time since the Smith decision in 1820, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia re-
viewed the federal precedent and attempted to ascertain the current
definition of piracy as defined by the law of nations.135 Despite its ef-
forts, the Court still managed to render two conflicting holdings in
United States v. Said-36 and United States v. Hasan,137 decided barely
two months apart.
1. United States v. Said
The defendants in Said, while cruising in the Gulf of Aden in a
small skiff, encountered the USS Ashland, an American vessel, and
fired upon it.138 Crew members aboard the vessel returned fire and
131. Id. at 624.
132. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2011); cf Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510 (1819)
(prescribing the death penalty instead of life imprisonment).
134. Id.
135. See discussion infra Part III.B.i-iii.
136. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (2010).
137. 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
138. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 566-57.
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destroyed the skiff.139 The record notes that none of the defendants
attempted to board the vessel and therefore had no opportunity to re-
move property from the ship.140 The American crew members
apprehended the defendants, and thereafter, the defendants were in-
dicted on several counts of piracy.141 The defendants moved to dismiss
the indictment, contending that the government failed to present facts
demonstrating that the defendants boarded or took control of the USS
Ashland and obtained anything of value.142 The government argued
for the Court to deny the motion because piracy historically included
different types of conduct and was not limited to the common law defi-
nition of robbery on land. 143
In holding that the crime of piracy requires robbery at sea, the
presiding Judge Jackson relied heavily on Smith, given that the case
was the only authority directly examining the proper definition. 144 In
his opinion, Jackson mostly analogized court decisions rendered within
the same century as Smith.145 The Said Court further advanced this
position with the support of Congressional revisions of Title 18 and
Commission reports. 146 Jackson also accepted the defendants' argu-
ment that the emergence of varying opinions from international critics
caused a global rift as to piracy jurisprudence. Thus, Smith provides
the clearest safeguard for American courts.147 Scholars were inconclu-
sive on whether the international community articulated an
exhaustive definition of general piracy.'48 Moreover, the Court as-
serted that each country is entitled to prosecute piracy according to
their individual municipal laws and penalties.149
In Judge Jackson's opinion, piracy had to remain defined as
robbery at sea, reasoning that the broad international standard con-
flicted with Smith's stable precedent. 150 Therefore, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia first deemed section 1651 inapplica-
ble in piracy cases where the government fails, as it did in Said, to




142. Id. at 557.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 562.
145. Id. at 560.
146. Id. at 562-63.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 564.
149. Id. at 565.
150. Id. at 567.
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vessel.15 1 Two months later, however, the same court reviewed the
same issue, based on similar facts, but ultimately held differently as to
the merits of the claim at bar. 152
2. United States v. Hasan
In Hasan, five Somalis set sail from Somalia with the intent to
locate, attack, and capture a vessel occupying the high seas. 153 The
defendants spotted and approached a merchant ship that turned out to
be the USS Nicholas, a U.S. Navy ship. 154 After the Somalis fired at
the vessel, the USS Nicholas returned fire, and subdued and appre-
hended the alleged pirates.155 Subsequently, a federal grand jury
indicted the Somalis for piracy.156 Like Said, each defendant filed sep-
arate motions to dismiss the action on the grounds that the
government could not establish the robbery element necessary to sup-
port a piracy claim.157
The question presented for review regarded the definition of
piracy, pursuant to section 1651.158 To answer the question, the
Hasan Court first determined that the Define and Punish Clause of the
Constitution confers to Congress universal jurisdiction to criminalize
certain crimes, including general piracy.159 The Court also noted that
a state may invoke this doctrine to prosecute piratical acts that fall
within the scope of the types of conduct that the international commu-
nity recognizes today.'6 0 Based on Supreme Court and foreign case
law, as well as international treaties, the law of nations as explicitly
referenced in section 1651 requires application of the modern-day cus-
tomary definition of general piracy.' 6 '
Taking into account the evolved state of the law of nations,
which Judge Jackson ostensibly overlooked, the Hasan Court found
that the definition of piracy included acts of violence committed at sea
for personal gain, even in the absence of an actual taking away of prop-
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).




157. Id. at 603.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 605.
160. Id. at 608-09.
161. Id. at 616-30.
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erty.16 2 The Court held that the fact that two of the defendants sailed
their assault boat towards and fired upon the USS Nicholas indicated
sufficient acts of violence committed at sea for private ends.163 Also,
because the other three Somalis boarded the assault cruiser with the
co-conspirators, they voluntarily and knowingly participated in the as-
sault.16 4 Unlike Said, the District Court in Hasan determined that the
law of nations and thus section 1651 did not require the government to
allege facts that the Somalis perpetrated an actual robbery upon the
USS Nicholas. 65 Therefore, the defendants were properly charged
with piracy.166
3. Other Supreme Court Opinions
While the Supreme Court established a working definition for
general piracy in 1820, the Court almost immediately qualified the def-
inition. Five years after ruling Smith, the Court purportedly
suggested in The Antelope, 67 in part, that the law of nations, to which
the Smith decision and the Act of 1790 were amensalistic, was not
crystallized. 168
In The Antelope, where United States citizens hunted and
boarded foreign ships and seized Portuguese and Spanish-owned
slaves, 69 the threshold issue for determination was whether the
United States had a paramount interest, over the Portuguese and
Spanish Consuls, as to the captured slaves.170 Because various sover-
eign nations during the early nineteenth century had not yet
proscribed the international slave trade, the Court first rejected the
Portuguese's and Spanish's arguments that such trade practice impli-
cated piracy.' 7 ' In the Court's view, no one nation may dictate the law
of nations or unilaterally impose its laws onto another country.172
162. Id. at 640-41 (referencing Geneva Convention on the High Seas ("High Seas
Convention"), art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 397; U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, art. 101, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397).
163. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 642.
166. Id.
167. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
168. Id. at 91 (holding that in light of the law of nations, the slave trade did not conflict
with the law of nations because it was "tolerated and encouraged" up until that moment in
time).
169. Id. at 67-68.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 66, 122.
172. Id. at 122.
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However, the Court noted that "[a] right, then, which is vested in all by
the consent of all, can be 'divested' only by consent . . . ."173 The major-
ity ostensibly foreshadowed the Hasan Court's charge to the United
States government of ensuring it deliberates amongst the sovereign
nations from time to time to ascertain the most current law of
nations. 174
Before the turn of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
articulated a similar holding in United States v. Arjona,175 in which the
government indicted foreigners for counterfeiting within the United
States of notes, bonds, and other securities of foreign governments.176
The issue was whether the law of nations could mandate Congress to
punish non-citizens that counterfeit foreign notes within the United
States.177 The majority opinion found that international customary
law, as it was then-currently reformed to incorporate emerging eco-
nomic trends, squarely applied to the recent developments of
transnational banking and foreign securities.178
The Court noted that the law, throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury, recognized the obligation to punish an individual who, within
their country, counterfeited coin money of another nation. 179 Prior to
the nineteenth century, foreign exchange was not a common custom
such that foreign markets would conceive that special protection
against transnational coin counterfeiting would be necessary.180 How-
ever, the vast upsurge of public enterprises and extensive borrowing
prompted United States banks to seek stricter safeguards for their
commercial securities in foreign markets.18 1 Almost immediately
thereafter, the international obligation to reciprocally enforce the law
of nations against transnational counterfeit activity became appar-
ent.1 8 2  The Court's decision in Arjona exemplified the undying
principle that the law of nations was and continues to evolve with
time. 183
Most recently, the Court also reviewed the binding effects of in-
ternational customary law under a slightly different lens. The
173. Id.
174. See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 629 (E.D. Va. 2010).
175. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
176. Id. at 480.
177. Id. at 483.
178. Id. at 486.
179. Id. at 484.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 485-86.
182. Id. at 487.
183. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 627 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain to determine whether the internationally accepted customs
deemed an alien's claim of arbitrary detention as cognizable in the fed-
eral courts.' 8 4 In reiterating the notion that the law of nations evolves
from time to time,185 the Court further asserted that federal courts
may rely on the present-day norms to reach decisions that would be at
odds with past rulings:
Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international char-
acter accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the [eighteenth-century] paradigms
we have recognized . . . It is enough to say that Congress may . . .
modify or cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on recogniz-
ing an international norm as such.186
The foregoing Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the Court
preserved its intent to divorce the Smith decision when international
customary law so required.
C. Piracy and Its International Effects
Barely 75 years ago, the Privy Council In re Piracy Jure Gen-
tium adjudicated charges against individuals for engaging in piratical
raids that occurred off the coast of China.187 Grounds for the case
arose when Chinese nationals cruising in junks had fired upon a Chi-
nese merchant ship.1 8 8 After the crewman of the vessel and
servicemen of the British Navy apprehended the defendants, the de-
fendants were indicted for piracy before the Court of Hong Kong. 89
The Court acquitted the defendants, holding that actual robbery,
which the government failed to allege, was necessary to support a con-
viction of piracy. 90
On review, the Privy Council held that actual robbery was an
immaterial element of the crime.19 ' Because the law of nations defined
piracy, the Council deferred to international treaties, state papers, mu-
184. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
185. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
186. Id. at 725, 731.
187. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, supra note 97.
188. Id. at 586.
189. Id. at 587.
190. Id. at 588.
191. Id. at 586.
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nicipal acts of Parliament, acts of municipal courts, and other scholarly
writings to ascertain the substantive requirements of piracy.192
Like Hasan, the Council first examined national legislation,
specifically the Act of Henry VIII., cap. 15 of 1536 ("Act"). 1 9 3 Analo-
gous to Palmer, Lord Sankey noted that misinterpretations of the Act
generated confusion concerning the definition of piracy.'94 Moreover,
Lord Charles Hedges opined that robbery was a requisite element of
criminal piracy and this was the anchor decision which promulgated
the robbery requirement. 9 5
As opposed to Judge Jackson's stare decisis approach in Said,
the Privy Council then conducted a thorough analysis of international
practices, proceedings, and commentaries (including American
sources), which unveiled several negating discrepancies. 196 First, the
working definitions of piracy were not exhaustive.19 7 The Privy Coun-
cil determined that the current definition of piracy was expansive to
reflect unforeseen occurrences.198 To verify its determination, the
Council referenced scholarly writings - ranging from American and
English jurists to Scottish textbooks.199 Furthermore, it held that
courts had misconstrued the Act to prescribe piracy as a common law
felony, rather than a civil law felony.200
The presiding panel concluded that the events of time expanded
the substance of international customary law against general
piracy. 201 Consequently, incorporation of recent events, either not pre-
viously contemplated or existing, warranted the broadening of piracy's
definition. 2 0 2
Hence, federal courts must now interpret international law to
reflect its evolved state, rather than its construction in the late-eight-
eenth century. 203 In other words, the law of nations should be applied

























Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 168.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Juxtaposing the Said ruling with other Supreme Court deci-
sions indicates one thing: The Said court rendered an inaccurate
ruling due to an incomplete analysis of both binding and persuasive
jurisprudence regarding contemporary piracy. 205 Perhaps this is true
because the presiding judge (Jackson) was appointed to judgeship in
1993 - soon after piracy's modern-day upsurge in the eastern hemi-
sphere, but before pirates threatened American vessels. 206 Assuming
Jackson faced this not-so-familiar issue in Said, it is reasonable to sug-
gest that he followed the stare decisis route rather than the road less
traveled. Essentially, however, the court's decision to advance the
"robbery" element of piracy was based on several assumptions and
Smith's obsolete precedent.
Nonetheless, several of the Supreme Court's rulings support the
position that Smith's holding is limited207 to its time because piracy, as
defined by the law of nations, is subject to perpetual evolution. 208
First, the court's Sosa decision illustrates two points: (1) district courts
may recognize private causes of action for certain tort offenses against
the law of nations, including piracy;209 and (2) judicial decisions may
be overturned or modified to conform to the evolved state of the law.2 10
In this, Sosa offers a remedy to Jackson's first assumption that federal
courts are entirely cautious to expand the construction of piracy be-
yond the "concrete consensus" of Smith.211 This decision magnifies
Congress's intent to endorse federal judges "general practice[s] of ...
exercising innovative authority over substantive law," so long as the
Legislature's purpose guides such practices.212 In the same regard,
Congress had no intention to confer authority upon federal courts to
derive general common law from the law of nations and thus encroach
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive branches regarding
205. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[Wjhere there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to
by judicial tribunals . . . for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.").
206. See At Sea, supra note 1.
207. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 622 (E.D. Va. 2010).
208. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); The Antelope, 23 U.S.
66 (1825); United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
209. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
210. Id. at 731.
211. See United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (2010).
212. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
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foreign affairs. 2 13 However, Congress did not expect federal courts to
disregard enforceable international causes of action merely because
particular areas of common law lose "metaphysical cachet" over
time. 2 1 4 Consequently, district courts may adjudicate those actionable
violations of international law, namely piracy, that are currently
couched in "specific, universal, and obligatory" universal norms. 215 It
necessarily follows that, comparable to the Sosa court's holding, piracy
must be gauged in the light of the modern state of international law. 2 16
The rationale behind this holding is also significant because it protects
citizens and foreigners from an ex post facto effect. 217 Applying the
1820 definition of general piracy to the interpretation of section 1651
would enable courts to unfairly prosecute acts that are no longer con-
sidered violations of the law of nations. 218 For instance, nineteenth-
century piracy applied to acts committed beyond a three-mile radius
from a nation's shore, demarcating the point of international high
seas. 219 Today, territorial waters extend twelve miles from a nation's
borders. 22 0 Thus, unless section 1651 changes in accordance with in-
ternational developments, individuals would be subject to prosecution
for 1820 crimes that occur within three miles of the United States
shorelines. 221
In The Antelope, the Court first asserted that the current law of
nations is dependent on a full consensus of the civilized nations. 2 22
Jackson conceded a very clear principle by stating that even though
the various nations are unsettled as to what constitutes piracy, world-
wide deliberation is always encouraged. 2 23 This demonstrates that al-
though one, definitive answer may not exist, many answers currently
do. Second, the Supreme Court inferred that some nations may unilat-
erally impose their municipal laws into other nations if the collective
body fails to deliberate. 224 Thrusting obsolete and prejudicial prece-
213. Id. at 727.
214. Id. at 730.
215. Id. at 724, 732.
216. Id. at 733.
217. See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (explaining due process concerns); see also
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (stating that interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to require
application of 1820 definition of general piracy could result in prosecutions of acts that no





222. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122; see also Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
223. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122.
224. Id.
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dent like Smith onto foreign perpetrators could potentially cause
tension between our federal judiciaries and foreign governments that
are continuously striving to prosecute pirates with the maximum will
of their authority. 225 Application of these rationales to Said refutes
Jackson's second assumption that there are no acts other than robbery
or depredation at sea that constitute piracy.
Turning to Arjona, the Court expounded upon ways in which
the law of nations had to evolve to ensure protection of common na-
tional interests during the emergence of foreign commercial
securities. 226 First, every nation possessed the inherent obligation to
protect other nations from their own counterfeiters.227 In certain cir-
cumstances, states within each nation's boundaries can also facilitate
the punishment of these perpetrators. 2 28 This guaranteed that all na-
tions would honor their moral obligations to protect one another.229
Moreover, countries that enforce universal counterfeit laws send the
unequivocal message that their respective regions will tolerate no such
crime. In this regard, each nation will also protect its economy and
citizens, as well as promote government relationships with its foreign
counterparts.
Nonetheless, Judge Jackson may contend that there is no single
country that can enforce the various laws and regulations of the civi-
lized nations. 230 However, Arjona's reasoning cures this third
assumption because international customary law is practically com-
mon law. It represents a continuously developing body of "judge-made
laws regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside domestic
boundaries," which the states historically have pledged to enforce. 231
225. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 ("It is one thing for American courts to enforce
constitutional limits on our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another
to consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has
transgressed those limits.").
226. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 486.
227. Id. at 487.
228. Id. (holding a violation of municipal law in a state may also constitute an offense
against the United States).
229. Id. (noting the United States' refusal to punish foreign counterfeiters "may not ...
furnish sufficient cause for war[ I but [ Iwould certainly give just ground of a complaint, and
thus disturb th[e] harmony between the governments which each is bound to cultivate and
promote. But if the United States can require this of another, that other may require it of
them, because international obligations are of necessity reciprocal in their nature.").
230. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122; Colangelo, supra note 64, at 160.
231. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Sosa, 542 U.S. at
715.
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Lastly, the Privy Council's analysis In re Piracy Jure Gentium
does not support Jackson's findings. The Council ruled in favor of a
broader and more modern interpretation of general piracy partly due
to two factors: legislative intent and the "known unknowns." 232 The
presiding Lord first recognized that an English court misconstrued The
Act of Henry VIII, such that it ultimately caused the courts to treat as
precedent the piracy definition which required robbery. 233 Therefore,
the In re Piracy Jure Gentium Council appeared to use the hearing as
an opportunity to correct subsequent misinterpretation of the six-
teenth-century law on piracy.234
The Council further suggests their Lordships were hesitant to
parse a bright-line definition of piracy, which eventually would be ma-
terially affected by later unforeseen circumstances. 235 Therefore, the
holding rendered under the High Court recognizes that a turn of
events can bring particular acts within the expansive purview of
piracy, albeit such acts were previously deemed innocent
commissions.236
Factors from the Privy Council's decision can squarely apply to
the issue presented before the Said court. First, the fact that the vari-
ous Congresses made subsequent variations to the piracy Act of 1790
indicates that Legislatures did not intend to enact a narrow piracy
statute as one of the country's first international law of its kind.23 7 It
is reasonable to presume that the Supreme Court's decision in Palmer
to not extend the original Act to foreigners probably hindered the
newly-independent nation's ability to send a clear message to piratical
perpetrators abroad.238 It can also be argued that the courts' defini-
tions of piracy had to fairly reflect the law of nations. Congress did not
intend to enact comprehensive piracy statutes that were practically
narrower than the international law; Congress left it to the federal
232. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, supra note 97, at 589-94.
233. Id. at 590-91.
234. Id. at 590.
235. See id. at 600 ("We have guarded against the dangerous ambition of wishing to
regulate and to foresee everything. . . . A new question spring up. . . . To [decide] this
question it is replied that the office of the law is to fix enlarged rules the general maxims of
right and wrong, to establish firm principles fruitful in consequences, and not to descend to
the detail of all questions which may arise upon each particular topic.").
236. Id.
237. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating Congress
passed the Act of 1819, in response to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the Act
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courts to determine the scope and extent of piracy's definition under
the collective body of nations at the time of an alleged offense.239
Second, the subsequent modifications of the piracy statute
demonstrate that Congress intended to leave room for error and un-
foreseen circumstances. Similar to the Privy Council, the Legislature
will likely take into account the fact that the universal expansion made
the law of nations susceptible to development.
Moreover, the reasoning in Said fails for a number of reasons
regarding public interest. A threshold issue is that acquittal of alleged
pirates due to a mere failure to find an occurrence of a robbery at sea
facilitates an endless cycle of funneling those perpetrators back into
the piracy world. It is also troubling enough that Somalis continuously
recruit new, young fleets; failure to prosecute even the slightest ges-
tures of aggression towards seagoing vessels could weaken the
deterrent factor the Obama Administration sought to effectuate when
it authorized the use of force against pirates. 240 Another issue within
the court's analysis is that Judge Jackson disregarded the Govern-
ment's main argument, which illuminated the very core of the Hasan
court's reasoning: Smith did not address acts other than robbery or for-
cible depredation that likely constituted piracy.241 The rejection of this
argument was chiefly grounded in due process concerns, particularly
that construing section 1651 to promulgate a flexible definition of gen-
eral piracy and thus reflect developing international norms would
subject alleged pirates to unconstitutionally vague crimes. 242 This con-
tention is unprecedented, however, because the universal
condemnation of piracy under the High Seas Convention and the UN-
CLOS clearly proscribes general piracy as a modern-day offense
against customary international law. 2 4 3 As previously stated, the Gov-
ernment further cautioned the court that the facts of Smith were
specifically limited to robbery encounters. 244
Pursuant to these treatises, Congress, in parsing the broad lan-
guage of section 1651, invited federal judges to reference the
239. Id. at 623; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942) (finding that Congress
decided against "crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against
the law of war;" instead Congress authorized courts to recognize applicable offenses).
240. Grier, supra note 9.
241. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (E.D. Va. 2010).
242. Id. at 566.
243. Hasan, 747 F.Supp. 2d at 638-39 (noting most countries have ratified the
UNCLOS, which reflects the current definition of general piracy; Somalia ratified the
UNCLOS in 1989, so it is reasonable to assume Somali nationals are familiar with the
piracy provisions in the treatise).
244. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
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international consensus from time to time for guidance in determining
the contemporary definition of piracy.245 Just as the Supreme Court
overlooked the significance of the eighteenth-century Congress's broad
parsing of the Act of 1790,246 Judge Jackson failed to construe section
1651 such that its reading would "reflect[] the definitive modern defi-
nition of general piracy under customary international law." 24 7
In light of the Said court's failure to recognize the actual impact
of universal expansion towards the current law of nations, it erred in
its ruling that the definition of general piracy requires an act of rob-
bery or depredation.
V. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, Judge Jackson erred in determining that
piracy can only be robbery at sea. It appears that the court rendered
this decision in light of exclusive reliance on the obsolete ruling of
Smith .248
This note demonstrates that Congress, in exercising its Define
and Punish powers, drafted piracy legislation that mirrored the law of
nations. 24 9 More importantly, Congress conferred the responsibility to
federal district courts to determine the scope and extent of piracy's def-
inition as reflected in the contemporary consensus of customary
international law. Just as our Legislature attentively recognized the
international community's general tendency to expand its jurispru-
dence, the Legislature also accepted as true that our municipal laws
must be assessed in accordance with the international unanimity.250
Unforeseen circumstances, such as the murders of American crew
members in 2010, have raised heightened concerns about maritime
safety. 251 For this reason, the courts made clear that the United
245. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24 (stating "Congress made a conscious decision to
adopt a flexible - but at all times sufficiently precise - decision of general piracy that would
automatically incorporate developing international norms regarding piracy. . . . [Riather
than having to revise the general piracy statute continually to ensure that it continued to
mirror the international consensus definition, Congress merely decided to define piracy by
explicit reference to the law of nations, such that any future change in the definition .
would be automatically incorporated into United States law.").
246. Id. at 612.
247. Id. at 639.
248. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (holding Smith is the only case to directly examine the
definition of piracy under section 1651).
249. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612-14.
250. Id. at 623.
251. Grier, supra note 9.
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States, like other countries, must interpret the law of nations as it ex-
ists in its evolved state. 252
In that regard, our federal courts and foreign tribunals no
longer confine the definition of piracy to the narrow scope of robbery at
sea. 2 5 3 Construing section 1651 as anything less than such would of-
fend the spirit of the statute, reestablish the issue of arrogance
towards the law of nations that the drafters contemplated, and jeop-
ardize future credibility of American jurisprudence. Furthermore,
federal courts should reject Judge Jackson's decision in the public in-
terest to prosecute piracy and deter future threats against American
vessels. Again, as the courts have previously articulated:
Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international char-
acter accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized ... It is enough to say that Congress may ... modify or
cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an inter-
national norm as such.254
The courts have realized that both the legislative and judicial
systems are flawed and fallible. As a matter of protecting individual
citizens and maritime interests, the courts should exercise a firm sense
of judicial reconstruction. This is significant to the perception of the
United States, given that it puts the world on notice that the United
States vows to honor its moral obligation not only to protecting its own
but to advance the overarching international mission.255
Piracy is a crime that may be found anywhere. Considering the
vast progression of the universal piratical movement, our courts should
do everything within their power to protect our country, as well as the
international community at large.
252. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
253. See, e.g., id. at 632; In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586, 588 (P.C.) (H.K.).
254. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 731 (2004).
255. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 487 (1887).
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